How the Treasury Would Be Funded
Under ECIP-1111 the Treasury’s revenue would be the base fee EIP-1559 charges every transaction: a charge Ethereum destroys, and one Ethereum Classic does not levy today. No new issuance is involved, and nothing is taken from what miners earn now: block rewards and priority-fee tips go to miners unchanged. The revenue rises and falls with how much the network is used.
The base fee
Credited by consensus under ECIP-1111, transaction by transaction, inside each transaction's own state transition. It is the primary source, and the only one the protocol directs.
Automatic · ECIP-1111 · Primary source
On-chain contributions
Once the address is published, anyone could send native ETC or tokens to it in one transaction. ECIP-1113 makes it the one contribution address for every asset class, so there is no second address to pick by mistake.
Voluntary · Any asset · One address
Mining contributions
A miner could name the Treasury's address as a block's beneficiary. Nothing requires it, and no ECIP redirects any part of what miners earn.
Optional · Block rewards · Miner's choice
Funding Flow
Transactions
Each pays the EIP-1559 base fee
Base fee
Credited per transaction
Treasury
The Sovereignty Vault address
Governance
Olympia DAO funding proposals
Recipients
Development, infrastructure, security, growth
Who Could Contribute
One address, open to every stakeholder
Once the Treasury’s address is published, contributing would take one on-chain transaction to that address, with no organization to join, no application and no relationship needed. ECIP-1113 requires any interface or site that solicits contributions to publish that address, for every asset class.
Exchanges & Custodians
A direct on-chain contribution to the published address, with no intermediary
Mining Operations
Block rewards directed to the Treasury's address, by the miner's own choice
Investment Product Issuers
A contribution to the published address, like any other stakeholder's
Individual Holders
Any amount, from any wallet, in a single transaction
Safeguards
Three checks the ECIPs place on every payment, each at a different point between a vote and the funds moving. Every movement of the Treasury’s balance would be recorded on-chain and independently verifiable.
Stock OpenZeppelin contracts
ECIP-1113The Treasury's proxy, its Timelock and the Governor are unmodified OpenZeppelin at a published release, and the Governor declares no logic of its own, so OpenZeppelin's own audit covers what is deployed and review confirms a configuration. CoreNFT, the one contract with written behavior, holds no funds.
A public, timelocked path
ECIP-1113Every payment is scheduled in the Timelock in public and waits out its delay before it executes, and the Governor can still cancel it in that window. Every governance action can be reconstructed from the contracts' event logs alone.
Recipient screening
ECIP-1119The interface a member votes through screens every address a proposal would pay against a sanctions list and shows the result, with no way to vote in favor of a designated address. Screening reaches recipients of value, never voters, and adds no contract to the governance core.
Together they keep the path between a vote and a payment short, public and audited. The stock contracts enforce the process, the Timelock gives the network time to see each payment coming, and screening gives the people who authorize a disbursement a current check of where it would go.
What the Design Rules Out
An institution assessing the Olympia Treasury usually asks a narrower question than how it would be governed: what could go wrong with the funds, and who would have to be trusted for it to happen. ECIP-1111, ECIP-1112 and ECIP-1113 answer it in their design. The properties below are what those drafts require of the consensus rule and the contracts, rather than commitments anyone makes about them.
A destination only a hard fork changes
ECIP-1111 credits the base fee to one permanent address, the Sovereignty Vault, held in every client's chain configuration. Changing it takes a coordinated hard fork, and no on-chain party can change it at all.
One route out
Funds leave only by a proposal that is voted, queued in the Timelock, delayed, then executed. ECIP-1113 makes the Governor the Timelock's sole executor, and no account can move funds around it.
No admin key, no multisig
ECIP-1113 prohibits owner-only functions, privileged multisigs and committees. The contracts that can hold or move funds are unmodified OpenZeppelin at a published release, so OpenZeppelin's own audit covers them.
A vote that cannot be bought
Voting power comes only from CoreNFT, a soulbound membership token carrying one non-delegable vote per member. With no tradeable governance token, nothing exists on which a market in votes could form.
No hidden balance
ECIP-1112 requires every implementation at the address to spend the account's real balance and to keep no ledger or deposit counter of its own, so what the Treasury holds, and its whole configuration, can be confirmed from chain state.
Repairable logic at a permanent address
A proposal can upgrade the implementation behind the address, so a disclosed vulnerability is fixed without a chain split. Upgrade authority is fixed when the proxy is built, cannot be repointed, and reaches nothing but the implementation it replaces.
Three contracts, inspectable before the network commits
The contracts would deploy before the activation fork, each against addresses that already exist, so the whole set can be read on-chain and reviewed before the network commits to it. Every contract that can hold or move funds is unmodified OpenZeppelin at a published release, which makes what the network audits a configuration rather than new code. CoreNFT is the one contract with written behavior, and it holds no funds.
| Contract | What it is | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Treasury | Stock OpenZeppelin transparent proxy over a TimelockController | Holds the base-fee revenue at the Sovereignty Vault address and enforces the execution delay. The only address the consensus layer commits to. |
| Governor | Stock OpenZeppelin Governor modules | Runs the proposal lifecycle and tallies votes. It is the Timelock's sole executor. |
| CoreNFT | Minimal soulbound ERC-721, declared against ERC-5192 | Membership and voting power: one non-delegable vote per member. Holds no funds. |
Before activation, ECIP-1112 requires the Treasury’s address, the verified source of every contract at and beneath it, where upgrade authority rests, and its full role table to be published and reproducible from chain state. That is what would let a third party confirm the properties above rather than trust them.
The treasury site, olympiatreasury.org